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ABSTRACT !
PERRY, HAILEY M. Determining the Effects of Hospital Consolidation: An   
 Examination of the Impact of Hospital M&A on Financial and Quality Metrics.  
 Department of Economics, June 2018. !
ADVISOR: PROFESSOR YOUNGHWAN SONG !
 The modern explosion of M&A activity in the United States has generated 
significant controversy and advocates both for and against hospital consolidation have 
been quite vocal in presenting their cases. Using mergers and acquisitions reports from 
Irving Levin Associates as well as financial and quality metrics from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services and the American Hospital Directory, this study 
examines the differences between consolidated and unconsolidated hospitals in terms of 
overall revenue and quality, in addition to prices and costs for specified diagnoses. 
Consolidated hospitals undergo significant changes during their transition and often times 
operate in a manner different than that of an unconsolidated hospital, suggesting that 
these figures will be different on a comparison basis. 
 To asses the differences between consolidated and unconsolidated hospitals, this 
paper uses Ordinary Least Squares regressions and three propensity score matching 
methods: nearest neighbor, kernel, and stratification matching. These matching methods 
are used to mitigate for the potential endogeneity associated with hospital M&A analysis.  
 This study finds that hospitals which underwent M&A between 2012 and 2014  
have higher revenues but lower quality, while they charge lower prices and cost less to 
payers for several of the presented diagnoses. To make hospital mergers and acquisitions 
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truly efficient, consolidated hospitals should strive to increase quality while continuing to 
operate in a financially efficient manner.  
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CHAPTER ONE !
INTRODUCTION !
A. Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions !
 Since 2010, the United States has seen a boom in the number of hospital mergers 
and acquisitions, following a historical pattern of large amounts of hospital 
consolidations occurring over a time period of several years. Looking at the year 2016, 
102 planned mergers and acquisitions were announced throughout the year, a 55% 
increase over the year 2010 (Kaufman Hall & Associates, 2017). Due to the critical and 
pervasive nature of the services which are provided by hospitals, changes within the 
hospital market can have impacts on the entire U.S. population, both in terms of the the 
quality of care delivered and the costs for the care. While the quality of care is most 
directly felt by patients and their families, changes in the costs for care are mainly 
absorbed by medical insurance providers, both public and private.  
 The modern healthcare era has presented a time where hospitals have struggled to 
remain financially stable as a result of increased quality requisites and inconsistent 
reimbursements from insurers. The threats that these hospitals face are real, 21 U.S. 
hospitals shuttered in 2016 alone, many in rural communities which now have no easy 
access to critical care (Ellison, 2017). Additionally, insurers both public and private are 
seeking to curtail growing healthcare costs by linking payment values to quality and 
efficiency of care, forcing hospitals to rethink their current models of care while facing 
declining reimbursements (MacDonald, 2017). Many hospitals have turned to mergers 
and acquisitions as a way to cut costs and remain afloat in the cutthroat healthcare 
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market. Although M&A is often perceived by hospitals as a means to survival, hospital 
consolidation is frequently met with arguments that hospitals use M&A as a way to 
obtain more money from insurance providers while simultaneously providing lower 
quality of care (Sutaria, 2013). As there are two sides to this hospital M&A story, the 
conflicting arguments make it difficult to ascertain the real effects of hospital 
consolidation.  
 Previous studies have examined the effects of hospital mergers and acquisitions 
on price, cost, quality, and revenues. As exemplified by the current flurry of M&A 
activity, hospital mergers and acquisitions tend to occur in waves, with the last explosion 
of mergers and acquisitions occurring in the 1990s. The year 2010 marked the beginning 
of a new wave which has not yet shown signs of slowing (Creswell and Abelson, 2013). 
Several research studies have been conducted on the effects of the mergers of the 1990s, 
while scholarly work is just now starting to examine the more recent wave. In the 
developing body of present-day studies, Schmitt (2017) looks at operations cost 
differences between hospitals as a result of consolidation for the years 1998 to 2012, 
while Su (2017) examines Medicare cost and quality changes as a result of hospital 
consolidation occurring between 2011 and 2013. When looking at hospital mergers and 
acquisitions, it is important to consider both financial and quality dimensions as Su 
(2017) does. The industry is an essential one which impacts the lives of the 
overwhelming majority of Americans in terms of both financial costs and physical 
wellbeing. This study is the first to examine price, cost, and quality effects of hospital 
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mergers and acquisitions for the hospitals which underwent M&A in between 2012 and 
2014, effectively encompassing both financial and quality analysis.  
!
B. Contributions and Organization of this Study !
 In an effort to ascertain some of the potential outcomes of hospital mergers and 
acquisitions, this study uses price, cost, and quality panel data from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), M&A data from Irving Levin & Associates, and 
hospital size and financial data from the American Hospital Directory. Additional sources 
provided supplemental data to these key sets. Through comparing consolidated hospitals 
and unconsolidated hospitals with similar bed sizes and state of operation, while 
controlling for year effects and hospital type, this study finds that hospitals which have 
undergone M&A have higher revenues, but lower quality. Consolidated hospitals also 
post lower prices and costs for many of the diagnoses evaluated. These results suggest 
that while consolidated hospitals may be delivering more financially efficient care, they 
should direct additional attention to increasing the quality of care delivered in order to 
deliver care that is efficient in terms of both cost and quality.  
 This thesis proceeds to explain the analysis of the implications of hospital mergers 
and acquisitions on the revenues, quality, and costs and prices for hospital services. 
Chapter 2 provides a formalized review of the outstanding literature on hospital M&A. 
Chapter 3 continues to explain the economic model applied in this analysis and the 
estimation methods used to arrive at the results, while Chapter 4 discusses the data 
incorporated, the construction of the sample, and pertinent limitations. The empirical 
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results are reviewed in Chapter 5, with relevant tables included at the end of the paper. 
These results are extended to include implications and suggestions for future research in 
the conclusion section found in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF THE IMPACTS OF HOSPITAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 This literature review examines existing studies of hospital mergers and 
acquisitions. Specifically, this literature review analyzes work prompted by upticks in 
hospital consolidation, paying particular attention to the characteristics of merging 
hospitals and their markets, motivations for mergers and acquisitions, arguments against 
consolidation, outcomes of consolidations with regards to cost, and outcomes with 
regards to price.  
!
A. Characteristics of Merging Hospitals and Markets 
 Due to the necessary services hospitals provide, hospitals exist in a wide variety 
of markets and are not always characterized by the same traits. In studies of hospital 
consolidations which consider impacts, economists have paid particular attention to 
hospital ownership differences, as well as the differences in the hospital market 
demographics. By recognizing that hospitals may change ownership type through 
consolidations, Sloan, Ostermann, and Conover (2003) consider what may prompt an 
ownership transition and conclude that hospitals are most likely to convert ownership 
because of a low profit margin. A conversion from nonprofit or government ownership to 
for profit status is most often preceded by consistently low margins and high debt-to-
asset ratios, while hospitals transition from for-profit to nonprofit soon after experiencing 
declines in margins. The authors also note that many mergers are motivated not only by 
low profit margins, but also by an ability and desire to increase market power. Further 
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exploring hospital ownership type, Connor et al. (1997) focus on the characteristics of 
hospital markets which see high volumes of hospital M&A. The researchers examine 
market structure in defined health service areas to reason that hospitals merge most often 
in areas with less market concentration, higher penetration of healthcare maintenance 
organizations (HMOs), and in areas that are defined by fewer rural characteristics. When 
looking at the characteristics of hospitals undergoing M&A, Connor et al. (1997) find 
that hospitals engaging in mergers are less likely to be government owned, more likely to 
be a member of a system, are larger in terms of beds and admission, and have higher 
occupancy rates and case-mix indexes.  
 While Connor et al. (1997) and Sloan, Ostermann, and Conover (2003) endeavor 
to determine important pre-merger conditions, in their study, Melnick, Keeler, and 
Zwanziger (1999) compare nonprofit hospitals to for-profit hospitals to examine their 
behavior after the completion of a merger. The study concludes that hospital mergers 
which reduce competition in a market lead to both the merging hospitals and their 
competitors raising their prices, hospital ownership status did not matter. The study also 
acknowledges that nonprofit and government hospitals have increasingly become less 
adverse to exploiting their market power through raising prices.  
 After identifying that only in-market mergers had been studied at length, Dafny, 
Ho, and Lee (2016) test out of market merger consequences. The study concludes that 
mergers and acquisitions which occur between hospitals which are not in the same 
hospital referral region (HHR) generate a meaningful difference in price post-merger only 
when the merging hospitals are located in the same state.  
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 Making additional contributions about hospital characteristics, Sloan (2001) looks 
at the non-profit dominated hospital market to ascertain some of the differences between 
non-profit and for-profit hospitals. The study finds that in terms of quality, hospital 
ownership status did not make a difference, but for-profit hospitals were more expensive 
to Medicare (Sloan, 2001). 
 Dafny (2009) notes in her study of hospital merger effects that hospital mergers 
do not occur randomly and therefore, examining mergers and acquisitions with certain 
estimation methods creates a problem of endogeneity. Her study corrects for this problem 
by looking at the price increases of rival hospitals after a merger of nearby independent 
hospitals, creating an interesting perspective on the market-wide impacts of hospital 
mergers (Dafny, 2009). 
!
B. Motivations for Mergers and Acquisitions 
 Defining some of the reasons which motivate hospitals to undergo costly and 
strenuous mergers and acquisitions can help to better explain why between 1998 and 
2012, the U.S. hospital market of approximately 5,000 acute care hospitals underwent 
1,133 mergers and acquisitions (Novak, 2017). Cooper et al. (2015) looks at the 
characteristics which are most prevalent in hospitals with desirable financial outcomes. 
Hospitals may engage in M&A in order to obtain some of these characteristics. Their 
study finds that being for profit, having more medical technologies, being located in an 
area with high labor costs, behind a bigger hospital, being located in an area with lower 
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income, and having a low share of Medicare patients are all market factors which are 
associated with the ability to generate higher prices. 
 In their study of the modern landscape of hospital mergers and acquisitions, 
Brown et al. (2012) identify that the Affordable Care Act (ACA), through enhancing 
attention to quality and scrutinizing payments, may be driving consolidation in a few 
ways. Under the ACA, payments to many hospitals will decrease as a result of the new 
payment structures, therefore hospitals must find new ways to reduce or share costs and 
strengthen negotiating ability with suppliers and insurers. The act also mandates 
additional spending on compliance and technologies such as electronic health records 
(EHR), areas where mergers and acquisitions may help hospitals achieve economies of 
scale. Brown et al. (2012) argue that the ACA is driving hospitals to merge by rewarding 
the hospitals which can leverage consolidation to lower their costs and improve quality.  
 Using pre - ACA data, Dranove and Shanley (1995) examine cost and reputation 
as motivations for mergers and acquisitions and conclude that although costs are not 
different between local hospital systems, there are reputation benefits associated with 
creating a hospital system. Local hospital systems are able to develop a “brand identity” 
which helps them to market a message of uniform quality across their system which in 
turn draws in patients, creating a merger incentive. 
!
C. Arguments against Consolidation 
 A common feature of the literature on hospital mergers and acquisitions is a 
debate of the potential impacts of consolidation on the price and quality of care delivered. 
!8
In reviewing the impacts of hospital consolidation, some economists have explicitly come 
out against M&A activity as they fear that the pitfalls of M&A outweigh the benefits (Xu, 
Wu, and Makary, 2015). Anti-consolidation advocates contend that there are other ways 
to achieve these goals which do not impact the structure or competition of hospital 
markets in a manner which leads to hospitals obtaining advantages not present with 
healthy competition (Ramirez, 2014; Tsai and Jha, 2014). On their part, hospitals argue 
that consolidation facilitates quality improvements and cost containment (Noether and 
May, 2017).  
!
D. Outcomes of Consolidation - Cost 
 As noted in Brown et al. (2012) and Dranove and Shanley (1995), a major 
motivation for  hospital consolidation is cost containment. The body of literature suggests 
that cost savings are realized by hospitals after mergers (Connor et al. 1997; Lynk, 1995; 
Schmitt, 2017). Specifically, Schmitt (2017) finds in his recent study that acquired 
hospitals realize cost savings between four percent and seven percent in the years 
immediately after acquisition. As there are different types of consolidation, Dranove and 
Lindrooth (2003) look at differences between system-to-system mergers versus           
one-to-one hospital mergers and find mixed results: system-to-system mergers yield no 
significant cost savings while one-to-one hospital mergers realize cost savings of about 
14%, further contributing that hospital and market characteristics are important when 
evaluating impact. All above mentioned costs are operational costs incurred by hospitals, 
in terms of labor and supplies that the hospitals must use in order to treat patients, with 
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these results suggesting that hospitals that undergo M&A achieve greater economics of 
scale and use the achievement to reduce their operational costs.  
 In her thesis, Su (2017) addresses changes in costs pre and post-merger for 
specific diagnoses while defining cost in a different way. Su (2017) defines cost as the 
amount Medicare pays to a hospital for a patient with a specific diagnosis. Her study 
finds that there are no significant differences in costs to Medicare pre and post-merger for 
the diagnoses covered in her study, but also concludes that while using mortality rates as 
a proxy for quality, certain diagnoses have mortality rates which are higher in 
consolidated hospitals.  
!
E. Outcomes of Consolidation - Price 
 While considering the impact of hospital mergers and acquisitions on price, there 
is considerable attention paid to price effects of mergers because if hospitals use M&A 
strengthen their bargaining ability, this may allow them to charge higher prices and 
subsequently receive higher reimbursements from insurers. The literature reviewed here 
indicates that hospital mergers decrease competition in the market and allow hospitals to 
significantly raise prices by asserting their new market power (Dafny, 2009; Dranove and 
Shanley, 1995; Krishnan and Krishnan, 2003; Xu, Wu, and Makary, 2015). Estimates for 
price increases range anywhere from nine percent to forty-five percent (Dauda, 2017; Xu, 
Wu, and Makary, 2015). However, some of the literature suggests increased concentration 
in the hospital market does not have a significant impact on price post - mergers (Moriya, 
Vogt, and Gaynor, 2010).  
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 Although some of the available literature concluded that defining hospitals by 
ownership type will not greatly impact the results on cost or prices after a merger or 
acquisition because their behaviors may in fact be similar, this study controls for 
ownership type and incorporates the bed size, state of operation, and year of 
consolidation because they are hospital characteristics which could further impact price 
and cost (Melnick, Keeler, and Zwangizer, 1999; Sloan, 2001). Using the same “cost” 
definition as Su (2017), this study furthers the work on the impacts of mergers and 
acquisitions on costs, examining more diagnoses than Su (2017), and also continuing the 
work on quality done by the paper. This examination also corrects for the endogeneity 
bias identified by Dafny (2009), something not done by Su (2017). To summarize, this 
thesis contributes a study to the scholarly body on the revenue, quality,  price, and cost 
impacts of hospital mergers and acquisitions.  
!
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CHAPTER THREE 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter contains both the econometric model and statistical methodology 
used in this study. A description and discussion of the dependent and independent 
variables is also included. 
!
A. Econometric Model used to Estimate the Effects of Hospital Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
 To determine how hospital mergers and acquisitions impact the dependent 
hospital revenue, quality, cost, and price variables included in this study, this examination 
employs the following econometric model: 
!
Hospital Outcome = β0 + β1Treatment + β2Beds + β3HospitalType + β4Year + β5State + ℇ, 
!
with ℇ as the error term.  
!
Dependent Variables  
GrossPatientRevenue The total amount of revenue generated for 
patient services.
TotalPerformanceScore The total score received out of 100 on the 
CMS Hospital Value Based Purchasing 
Program assessment.
MedicarePayments039 Average Medicare cost for patients with 
DRG 039: Extracranial Procedures without 
Complications or Major Complications or 
Comorbidities.
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AverageTotalPayments039 Average total cost for patients with DRG 
039: Extracranial Procedures without 
Complications or Major Complications or 
Comorbidities.
AverageCoveredCharges039 Average total price for patients with DRG 
039: Extracranial Procedures without 
Complications or Major Complications or 
Comorbidities.
MedicarePayments190 Average Medicare cost for patients with 
DRG 190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disorder with Major Complications or 
Comorbidities.
AverageTotalPayments190 Average total cost for patients with DRG 
190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disorder with Major Complications or 
Comorbidities.
AverageCoveredCharges190 Average price for patients with DRG 190: 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder 
with Major Complications or Comorbidities.
MedicarePayments193 Average Medicare cost for patients with 
DRG 193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy 
with Major Complications or Comorbidities.
AverageTotalPayments193 Average total cost for patients with DRG 
193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with 
Major Complications or Comorbidities.
AverageCoveredCharges193 Average price for patients with DRG 193: 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with Major 
Complications or Comorbidities.
MedicarePayments282 Average Medicare cost for patients with 
DRG 282: Acute Myocardial Infarction, 
Discharged Alive without Complications or 
Major Complications or Comorbidities.
AverageTotalPayments282 Average total cost for patients with DRG 
282: Acute Myocardial Infarction, 
Discharged Alive without Complications or 
Major Complications or Comorbidities.
AverageCoveredCharges282 Average price for patients with DRG 282: 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged 
Alive without Complications or Major 
Complications or Comorbidities.
MedicarePayments291 Average Medicare cost for patients with 
DRG 291: Heart Failure & Shock with 
Major Complications or Comorbidities.
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Note: GrossPatientRevenue definition comes from the American Hospital Directory, while all other 
definitions come from cms.gov. !!!
Independent Variables 
  
 The dependent variables are divided between overall hospital variables and 
diagnosis related variables. The dependent variable GrossPatientRevenue is an overall 
variable equal to the revenue earned by hospitals in the year 2017 in constant 2015 
dollars. The second overall hospital variable, TotalPerformanceScore, is used as a 
measurement of hospital quality. The variable encompasses scores given by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for mortality, experience of care, safety, 
efficiency, and cost reduction. This study includes this variable as a means of comparing 
AverageTotalPayments291 Average total cost for patients with DRG 
291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major 
Complications or Comorbidities.
AverageCoveredCharges291 Average total price for patients with DRG 
291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major 
Complications or Comorbidities.
Treatment 1 if the hospital underwent a merger of 
acquisition between 2012 and 2014; 0 if not 
Beds The number of staffed beds available
HospitalType A group of dummy variables which are equal 
to 1 when the type matches the specified 
hospital type; 0 if not. Types are broken 
down between Government, Voluntary 
Nonprofit, and Proprietary with further 
subcategories. 
Year A group of dummy variables which are equal 
to 1 when the year matches the specified 
data year; 0 if not. Years range from 2011 to 
2015. 
State A group of dummy variables which are equal 
to 1 when the state matches the specified 
hospital state; 0 if not. 18 states are included 
in this analysis.
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unconsolidated and consolidated hospitals on a basis of quality of care delivered, as the 
quality of care delivered should be the among the most important considerations, but also 
because CMS has begun to link reimbursements to the quality of care delivered. The 
inclusion of this variable helps to estimate whether or not consolidated hospitals will be 
able to maintain their level of reimbursements or if they should expect to see declines in 
reimbursements as compared to their unconsolidated peers as a result of their quality 
scores.  
 The next group of dependent variables are diagnosis specific and pertain to the 
prices and costs for the five diagnoses selected for analysis in this study. All five 
diagnoses, DRGs 039, 190, 193, 282, and 291 were chosen from the 100 most common 
Medicare covered diagnoses. The diagnoses were selected from this group in the hopes 
that their common occurrence would allow for them to have sufficient data for many of 
the merged and unmerged hospitals in the analysis. It is important to note that the 
diagnoses are only inclusive of the population which Medicare provides insurance for, 
typically U.S. citizens over the age of 65, and therefore these diagnoses may not be 
among the most frequent across the entire U.S. population. The prefixes for the study 
diagnosis variables, MedicarePayments, AverageTotalPayments, and 
AverageCoveredCharges denote whether or not the variable is a price or cost for the 
diagnosis.  The MedicarePayments prefix refers to the average cost to Medicare for a 
patient diagnosed in that hospital with that particular condition after Medicare applies 
algorithms to determine payment amount and the hospitals respond with negotiations 
relating to advanced costs for particular patients related to severity, complications, and 
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comorbidities. AverageTotalPayments is similar to the MedicarePayments prefix, but 
refers to the average amount that supplemental insurance and patients pay to cover the 
remainder of charges for the diagnosis. This number is also subject to negotiations 
between insurances and the hospitals. If one were to add MedicarePayments and 
AverageTotalPayments for a diagnosis, they would arrive at the total cost to all payers for 
the diagnosis. Finally, the prefix AverageCoveredCharges describes the average sticker 
prices charged by hospitals for the five diagnoses included in this examination. 
AverageCoveredCharges are the contributing values to GrossPatientRevenue, 
representative of the amounts hospitals would receive if they were not subject to 
reductions from Medicare or other insurers. 
 Based upon the factors identified by Brown et al. (2012) as motivations for 
mergers and acquisitions, the expectation is that GrossPatientRevenue will increase as a 
result of consolidation. Brown et al. (2012) indicate in their review of modern 
motivations for hospital M&A that hospitals engage in consolidations in order to 
strengthen bargaining power with insurers. This suggests that hospitals will use this 
heightened ability to charge a higher sticker price to insurers based upon their ability to 
obtain more in payments. There is an expectation that quality will be lower in hospitals 
which underwent a merger or acquisition as proponents of increased scrutiny for hospital 
mergers and acquisitions often argue that consolidated hospitals provide patients with 
lower quality care (Ramirez, 2014; Tsai and Jha, 2014). In her examination of hospital 
M&A which uses mortality as a proxy for quality, Su (2017) finds that mortality rates 
increased in hospitals which underwent M&A between the years of 2011 and 2014, 
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suggesting that lower quality of care is being delivered in consolidated hospitals. The 
diagnosis variables of MedicarePayments, AverageTotalPayments, and 
AverageCoveredCharges are also expected to have positive coefficients. Following the 
thinking of Brown et al. (2012) presented above, GrossPatientRevenue is a summation of 
all the diagnosis values for AverageCoveredCharges, therefore the increased bargaining 
power should increase the individual diagnosis prices as well. The ability of hospitals to 
exact more from insurers and other payers should increase the two cost variables, 
MedicarePayments and AverageTotalPayments, because the larger hospitals will use their 
strengthened negotiating clout to garner more in return for their services from insurers, 
effectively costing both Medicare and non-Medicare payers more.  
 The independent variables were selected because of their potential impacts on the 
outcome variables for hospitals. The key independent variable, Treatment, divides 
hospitals on the basis of whether or not they underwent a merger and acquisition between 
the years of 2012 and 2014. This variable creates the primary comparison groups for this 
study before additional specifications are applied. The next independent variable assessed 
was Beds, which is equivalent to the number of staffed beds in a hospital via the Irving 
Levin and Associates reports for merged hospitals and from the American Hospital 
Directory for unmerged hospitals. Current research suggests that hospitals with greater 
numbers of staffed beds may deliver lower quality of care while costing more to 
insurance and Medicare, particularly in the case of highly regarded and highly expensive 
academic medical centers (Ibrahim, 2016). Beds is used as a contributing value to the 
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propensity score matching methods which will be discussed in the statistical 
methodology.  
 As business entities, hospitals are not all the same, therefore the independent 
variable HospitalType controls for the differences in hospitals which come from the 
ownership types. This study incorporates hospitals which file their taxes as Government, 
Voluntary Nonprofit, and Proprietary organizations. The majority of U.S. hospitals file as 
Voluntary Nonprofit, with approximately 50% of U.S. hospitals specified as nonprofit in 
2016 (American Hospital Directory, 2018). Government organizations are further 
separated by State, Local, Federal, and Hospital District, while Voluntary Nonprofit has 
Church, Private, and Other specifications. Government and Voluntary Nonprofit hospitals 
behave in a manner which does not seek profits, but still strive to maintain their financial 
viability while Proprietary hospitals seek to maximize profits and return to stakeholders, 
potentially creating differences in the way these hospitals deliver services.  The 
independent Year variable holds constant the fluctuations which pertain to the years 
included in this analysis, creating a dummy variable specification for every year 
incorporated in the analysis. The study uses price and cost data from 2011 to 2015 and 
M&A data from 2012 to 2014. The inclusion of Year also allows for the data alignment 
from various sources. The final independent variable, State, controls for state level effects 
which may have impacted the resulting estimates. Dafny, Ho, and Lee (2016) establish in 
their study that state level hospital markets are important in the sense that mergers and 
acquisitions within the same state do generate significant differences in prices post 
merger. The 2016 study examines beyond hospital referral region (HRR) markets 
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typically studied in hospital M&A analysis and shows that mergers and acquisitions do 
not matter between hospitals located in different states, suggesting that unique 
characteristics within state markets allow for significant price effects to occur after M&A 
(Dafny, Ho, and Lee, 2016). Based upon the results of Dafny, Ho, and Lee (2016), State 
also contributes to the propensity score by creating matches for consolidated hospitals 
within the same state to ensure that consolidated hospitals receive matches with 
unconsolidated hospitals which are subject to similar market characteristics.  
!
B. Statistical Methodology !
 This paper uses two separate methods to estimate the econometric model. The 
study includes Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates and three different propensity 
score matching methods: nearest neighbor, kernel, and stratification matching. Due to the 
fact that studies of hospital mergers and acquisitions are observational and these hospitals 
mergers and acquisitions do not occur randomly, certain estimations of the effects of 
hospital mergers and acquisitions may be biased due to an endogeneity problem. 
Identified by Dafny (2009), this problem arises from the difficulty of controlling for the 
motivation of every hospital merger and acquisition, potentially correlating the merger 
term with the error term in regressions. This study still uses OLS estimates to try to 
determine the effect of hospital mergers and acquisitions on revenue, quality, prices, and 
costs, but these estimates may be biased due to endogeneity because all merger motives 
are not controlled for.  
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 To produce estimates not biased by endogeneity, three types of propensity score 
matching are also used. The hospitals are first separated on a basis of whether or not they 
underwent a merger or acquisition, and then an estimated propensity score is constructed 
with the staffed bed size, year of data, state, and hospital type. The estimated propensity 
scores are then used in the three propensity methods to create matches for comparison 
based upon the methodology of each propensity score method. In short, Nearest neighbor 
matching compares hospitals which are most like one another, kernel matching compares 
each merged hospital to the average of the unmerged, and stratification matching 
compares intervals of scores. These three methods prevent the endogeneity generated by 
this observational study by assuming that the treatment, in this case M&A, is exogenous, 
allowing for inferences to be made about the effects of the treatment. A detailed 
description of the three matching methods is available in Appendix A2. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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CHAPTER FOUR !
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION !
 Chapter Four contains the data selection process and uses of data in this study. It 
includes an overview of the data sources, what variables were taken from each source, 
and their relevant limitations. Chapter Four also provides an explanation of how the data 
sample was constructed for this study and the descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variables.  
!
A. Overview of the Data 
 To look at the price and cost effects of hospital mergers and acquisitions, this 
study gathers M&A data from Irving Levin Associates’ publication, The Health Care 
Services Acquisition Report. Irving Levin Associates is a trusted provider of healthcare 
sector market intelligence for both investors and researchers (Irving Levin Associates, 
2017). Irving Levin reports have been the primary provider of M&A information in many 
recent hospital studies, including Su (2017) and Schmitt (2017). Detailed hospital sector 
reports were obtained for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014. The reports provided the target 
acquisition hospital, ownership type, location, size, basic financial information, and deal 
structure, as well as the acquiring hospital name and location.  
 The analytical assessment of mergers and acquisitions can be problematic because 
of the risk of endogeneity, identified by Dafny (2009). A problem of endogeneity can 
occur because hospital mergers and acquisitions do not occur randomly, therefore the 
merger or acquisition term in analysis is likely correlated with the error term containing 
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the consolidation motivation. Although the deals provided by Irving Levin and Associates 
provided some of the motivations for M&A, the motivations can be tough to quantify and 
were not incorporated in every deal structure. Therefore, the mergers and acquisitions 
provided by Irving Levin Associates could very well suffer from the endogeneity when 
analyzed. The analysis done in this study on M&A effects mitigated for the endogeneity 
problem by using propensity score matching methods. 
 In order to select hospitals for comparison to ascertain the effects of M&A 
activity, a dataset was constructed from the most current American Hospital Directory. 
The American Hospital Directory is a national level provider of  statistics on U.S. acute 
care hospitals (American Hospital Directory, 2017). Organized by state, the AHD 
directory provides cross-sectional data in the form of hospital name and total number of 
staffed beds, as well as the nominal gross revenue generated by providing care to 
patients. For the purposes of this analysis, the gross revenue values were chained to 
constant 2015 dollars. The American Hospital Directory compiles the state level data lists 
from a variety of reputable sources, including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services and the Joint Commission. A limitation of the American Hospital Directory data 
is that archived databases are not available, therefore the data incorporated in this study is 
the most recent data available. Although the merged hospitals were assessed based upon 
their staffed bed count at the time of the merger, they were matched with hospitals based 
upon a more recent number of staffed beds. The lack of an archived database prevents a 
comparison of consolidated hospitals to the unconsolidated hospitals which were most 
like them at the time of the merger. 
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 Hospital ownership type is a characteristic which has been examined for price and 
costs effects in the outstanding literature because hospitals of differing ownership types 
operate in different ways (Melnick, Keeler, and Zwanziger, 1999). This study sought to 
control for these effects by controlling for hospital ownership type. The cross-sectional 
hospital ownership type data came from Data Lists, a database broker for a wide variety 
of U.S. industries (Data Lists, 2018). Data Lists builds databases using a research team, 
who combines internet research and interview methods to construct the sets. The database 
divides hospitals into several ownership categories: Government, Voluntary Nonprofit, 
and Proprietary. Hospitals are further divided within Government and Voluntary 
Nonprofit, with Government divided between Federal, Hospital District, Local, and State, 
and Voluntary Nonprofit divided into Private, Church, and Other. This database is the 
most current available, with no archived data available, similar to the limitations of the 
American Hospital Directory data. Although the hospitals which underwent mergers and 
acquisitions used their hospital ownership status at the time of consolidation during the 
analyses, all other untreated hospitals were updated to this most recent ownership type, 
which may have created biased estimates if unconsolidated hospitals were to have 
converted ownership type in the defined time period, but were most like a consolidated 
hospital at the time of M&A.  
 Data Lists also provides data for the number of beds within the hospitals, similar 
to the information provided by the American Hospital Directory. The American Hospital 
Directory bed data was selected for this analysis because although the database provides 
fewer hospitals than Data Lists, the database provided by Data Lists did not provide a 
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number of beds for every hospital within the database and also did not specify if values 
provided for beds were the licensed or available staffed beds.  
 The measure of hospital quality used in this analysis was a measure of overall 
hospital performance derived from a weighted combination of scores in four areas of 
care. This data comes from the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program, 
which is run by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. HVBP is an initiative 
which uses a combination of outcomes, patient experiences, safety, and cost reduction 
measures to measure quality of care in hospitals. The program adjusts Medicare 
reimbursement rates for hospitals based upon their HVBP scores (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2017). The data used for this analysis for all hospitals comes 
from the December 2017 scores given to hospitals, the most current available, but may 
limit analysis because the hospitals were unable to be evaluated on their scores at the 
time of merger or acquisition or on a continual basis. 
 The panel nominal price and cost data for the selected diagnoses come from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Provider Utilization and Payment 
Inpatient Database. Data sets were obtained for the years 2011 - 2015 and contain 
average price, cost, and discharge statistics for the 100 most common covered inpatient 
diagnoses for all U.S. hospitals which are certified by Medicare (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2018). In this study, the price and cost values were chained to 
constant 2015 dollar to mitigate the effect of inflation. While prices are the amounts that 
hospitals attempt to receive for rendering medical services, costs are what Medicare and 
other payers of healthcare actually pay for these diagnoses. The final amount paid by 
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Medicare is a product of an algorithm which combines factors including identified 
diagnosis, severity of diagnosis, teaching hospital status, and proportion of patients 
served who are uninsured or who receive Medicaid. In an effort to encourage elevated 
quality of care, Medicare also linking an increasing portion of reimbursements to 
outcomes and quality of care delivered (Reinhardt, 2010). The open availability, national 
scope, and range of diagnoses included in the data made the Medicare set suitable for this 
analysis. The data is limited in the fact that Medicare only purchases care for senior 
Americans, so the inpatient diagnoses included are not reflective of the entire U.S. 
population. The data spans a sufficient number of years to ensure that all mergers and 
acquisitions assessed in this analysis have price and cost data available for one year prior 
and one year after the merger or acquisition event. A detailed description of the individual 
variables used in this study is available in Appendix A1. 
  
B. Determination of the Sample 
 This paper originally draws from 9,074 hospitals located in the United States. 
Hospitals located outside of the 50 states or Washington D.C. were not used for this study 
because this paper specifically examines the effects of merger and acquisitions on the 
U.S. hospital market. Hospitals located outside of this geographic specification are 
subject to different healthcare delivery and payment systems, and may not have the same 
data available as the hospitals within the U.S. market. Beyond the geographic 
specification,  the hospitals had to meet several criteria in order to be used in the final 
sample. The hospitals had to be general acute care, non specialty hospitals and reported 
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on by the American Hospital Directory to ensure availability of annual bed, gross patient 
revenue, and state data. Furthermore, the hospitals had to be Medicare certified. The final 
hospitals also had to be participants in the Hospital Values-Based Purchasing (HBVP) 
Program in 2017 for the included annual quality score. After applying these criterion, 
3,277 hospitals were part of the final analysis, where 161 of these hospitals underwent 
consolidations in the years 2012 to 2014. 
!
C. Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables of the 3,277 hospitals evaluated 
in this study can be found in Table 1. Surprisingly, the statistics show that consolidated 
hospitals have an average revenue in USD that is lower than that of unconsolidated 
hospitals, and less surprisingly have a lower average quality score out of 100 possible 
points. These statistics suggest that on average, hospitals which do not undergo M&A 
earn higher revenues and perform better on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) quality analysis. The CMS quality scores are an important figure which  
net hospitals higher reimbursement rates for higher scores, while comparatively high 
revenues are also important in an era where many hospitals struggle to keep their doors 
open. Based upon the descriptive statistics presented, consolidated hospitals need to work 
to increase both their revenues and quality in order to remain viable moving forward, 
particularly as quality dictates a greater percentage of compensation.  
 There were no significant differences found between the unmerged and unmerged 
hospital groups in terms of the average number of staffed beds. When rounded, both 
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merged and unmerged hospitals had an average of 227 staffed beds. The remainder of the 
descriptive statistics show very few significant differences between the two hospital 
groups, however, there are differences in the price in USD charged by hospitals for DRGs 
039, 193, and 291, all demonstrating that hospitals which have undergone M&A charge 
less on average for the care provided for these diagnoses, potentially an indication of the 
reasoning for the lower average revenue. The varied number of observations for the 
overall hospital metrics as well as the diagnoses is reflective of the challenges of working 
with observational data. The overall hospital metrics provide averages based upon the 
entire sample of 3,277 hospitals, while each diagnosis looks at only a subset of these. 
This is due to the fact that although these diagnoses were selected from the 100 most 
common Medicare diagnoses, not all hospitals have a significant amount of cases in the 
data set or contain complete data for evaluation.  
!
!
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CHAPTER FIVE !
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE EFFECTS OF HOSPITAL M&A ON REVENUE, 
QUALITY, COSTS, AND PRICES !
 This chapter contains the summary of the empirical results gathered during this 
study, including estimates from both the OLS and propensity score matching method 
regressions. Additionally, this chapter compares the results of this study to published 
studies and reviews the potential limitations of these results.  
!
A. Empirical Results 
 Estimates of the effects of mergers and acquisitions for all dependent variables 
using OLS and the three specified matching methods can be found in Tables 2 and 3 
respectively. In Table 2, Columns 1 and 2 contain the estimates for all dependent 
variables for the Treatment and Beds regressors from the OLS regressions, while 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3 contain the estimates for all dependent variables for the 
nearest neighbor, kernel, and stratification matching methods. A further explanation of 
the matching methods utilized is available in Appendix A2. 
  Both tables control for year, state, and hospital type differences which could bias 
the estimates. Although the results varied in significance and the coefficients may have 
varied due to the means of comparison used in the matching methodologies, the study 
found that the three matching method estimates are largely in support of each other. 
 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, displaying the Treatment and Beds OLS regressors, 
presented very different results in terms of quantities of significant values. All values for 
Beds in Column 2 had significant outcomes, with all positive coefficients with the 
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exception of TotalPerformanceScore, the quality measure. The negative quality 
coefficient demonstrates that having a greater number of beds decreases the quality of 
care delivered. It is important to note that the staffed beds data was scaled during 
analysis, where coefficients are equal to increases of 100 beds. The positive coefficient 
indicated that increasing hospital staffed bed size by 100 creates significant increases in 
revenue of about 40%. An increase of 100 beds was shown to generate significant 
increases in prices and costs for all included diagnoses. The Treatment results in Column 
1 for the revenue and quality dependents were similar to the results of Column 2 in terms 
of coefficient sign and significance, finding that revenue significantly increased for 
consolidated hospitals, but quality significantly decreased. In terms of additional 
significant results, Treatment only suggested that there were significant decreases in the 
price for DRG 039 and the cost to Medicare for DRG 190 for hospitals which had 
undergone M&A.  
 Following the results found in Table 2, all three matching methods found in Table 
3 indicate that consolidated hospitals experience significant increases in revenue when 
compared to their unconsolidated peers. Also similar to the results found in Table 2, both 
kernel and stratification matching support that hospitals which have undergone a merger 
or acquisition in the defined time period deliver significantly lower quality of care. When 
looking at prices and costs for the included diagnoses, all available matching methods 
display significant and negative results for the price of DRG 039, 190, 193, and 291, 
indicating that consolidated hospitals charge payers less for these diagnoses. The 
combination of negative price coefficients with increased revenues is a surprising one, as 
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revenue is a composite of prices. This is a potentially a function of consolidated hospitals 
serving more patients, or charging more for diagnoses not assessed in this analysis. 
Columns 3 and 4 both show negative and significant outcomes for the Medicare cost for 
DRG 039, as well as the price of DRG 282, showing comparatively lower cost and price 
for these diagnoses. The nearest neighbor and stratification matching methods both 
display that the cost to Medicare is lower for DRG 193. Of all three columns, the nearest 
neighbor method offered the most significant results, all of which were negative with the 
exception of the revenue variable. This outcome means that the comparison created by 
the nearest neighbor method of estimation generated the most significant differences 
between the hospital groups of all three methods of estimation attempted in Table 3. This 
shows that when hospitals are compared on this basis, consolidated hospitals experience 
lower quality, prices, and costs than their unconsolidated counterparts. 
!
B. Comparison to the Literature 
 While considering the price and cost effects of mergers and acquisitions in this 
analysis, this study is largely in line with the findings of several of the previous studies 
(Connor et al. 1997; Lynk, 1995; Schmitt, 2017). Although his study looks specifically at 
the costs incurred to hospitals pre and post mergers, Schmitt (2017) finds that hospitals 
experience cost savings of between four percent and seven percent after undergoing a 
merger. The significant results found for the prices charged by consolidated hospitals as 
well as the results for Medicare and non-Medicare costs agree with the outcomes of the 
Schmitt (2017) study. In order for hospitals to post lower prices and accept lower 
!30
reimbursements from payers, a reduction in costs on their end is required for hospitals to 
keep their doors open. 
 Although this study does agree with several others, there are studies which it 
disputes as well. In their review of outstanding studies on the impacts of consolidation on 
price, Xu, Wu, and Makary (2015) assert that consolidated hospitals increase the prices 
charged and also increase the bargaining clout for hospitals to exact higher payments 
from insurers. This difference may be a reflection on the specific markets examined in the 
studies reviewed by Xu, Wu, and Makary (2015). The researchers focused on the 
California market, particularly California based insurers and the metropolitan hospital 
markets of Los Angeles and San Francisco. California is a densely populated state with 
close to 350 hospitals, with many of these hospitals located within the same county or 
metropolitan area. California’s hospital market is also characterized by a large amount of 
consolidated hospital networks and a high number of mergers and acquisitions (American 
Hospital Directory, 2017). The results of the Xu, Wu, and Makary (2015) examination 
may in fact be a reflection of a market which is no longer competitive because of the 
large number of hospital systems and consolidations, while this study looks at a broader 
geographic range where consolidation activities could be helping to support hospital 
savings. 
!
!
!
C. Limitations of the Results 
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 This study presents OLS regressions which control for year, state, and hospital 
ownership type effects. Dafny (2009) suggests in her study that these types of regressions 
may suffer from endogeneity because hospitals do not undergo mergers and acquisitions 
randomly, and choose to partake in them for a wide variety of reasons, making it nearly 
impossible to control for all of these motivations to prevent a correlation with the error 
term. Although the estimates presented in this study may still suffer from endogeneity 
after the use of select controls, the use of the three propensity matching methods was 
incorporated to produce results theoretically unbiased by endogeneity.  
 The examination uses a Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services performance 
score as a proxy for quality, however the performance score is not inclusive of a wide 
range of measures and is skewed to examine outcomes which are part of ongoing 
Medicare quality initiatives. Quality in healthcare is tough to define and may mean 
different things to different patients, therefore the quality results found by this study may 
not be the same if a different quality measure was selected. 
 The estimates presented in Tables 2 and 3 may be biased as a result of the data 
used in the analysis. Much of the data used, including staffed beds, revenue, quality, and 
hospital type were the most current values available for unconsolidated hospitals, with no 
previous data available for the years 2012 - 2014 that the mergers and acquisitions 
occurred in. In terms of revenue and quality, this curtailed the breadth of the analysis 
available for these dependent variables by only allowing for one year of analysis. All 
unconsolidated hospitals had staffed bed and hospital type data that was the most updated 
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available, preventing the matching of consolidated hospitals with the hospital that was 
most like them at the time of the merger or acquisition, a potential risk for the estimates. 
!
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CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Summary of Study Findings 
 By creating a comparison between hospitals that underwent a merger or 
acquisition in 2012 through 2014 and hospitals which did not consolidate in that time 
period, this study examines the differences between these two groups in terms of prices 
charged by the hospitals for services, costs to Medicare and other healthcare payers, 
hospital revenue, and hospital quality. This study is the first to look at both prices charged 
by hospitals alongside the costs realized by healthcare payers while correcting for the 
endogeneity associated with hospital M&A analysis. 
 This analysis finds that regardless of whether or not a hospital underwent a 
consolidation activity, hospitals which have a greater number of beds have higher 
revenues, charges more for services and incur higher costs to payers, while quality 
decreases as the number of beds increases. This study also finds that hospitals which 
engaged in M&A in the defined time period generally had higher revenues, lower quality, 
and in the case of many diagnoses, posted lower prices and had lower costs for payers.  
!
B. Implications of the Findings !
 The results of this study contribute to the widening debate on hospital M&A and 
how to best police it moving forward. Advocates for the prevention of hospital 
consolidation publicize that hospitals which have undergone mergers or acquisitions exert 
their market power to charge higher prices and elicit higher reimbursements from payers, 
!34
however this study does not support that claim and in fact directly disputes it with the 
results for several of the study diagnoses. However, an additional claim made by 
opponents of hospital M&A is that consolidated hospitals end up delivering lower quality 
care to patients. This argument is supported in this study, patients do receive significantly 
lower quality care in hospitals which merged between 2012 and 2014.  
 As hospitals struggle to remain secure in a market with quality tied 
reimbursements and ever increasing costs, a major motivation for hospitals to pursue 
mergers and acquisitions is to stabilize or increase their revenues. This study 
demonstrates that consolidated hospitals significantly increase their revenues, promoting 
this as a potential option for hospitals which may be struggling. 
 The above results contribute to a greater overall picture, the outcomes of this 
study indicate that hospital M&A is a viable way for hospitals to lower prices and costs to 
payers with respect to certain diagnoses while also increasing their revenues. Work still 
needs to be done in terms of pairing these successes with increased quality in order to 
achieve efficiency which encompasses both financial and quality metrics. Consolidated 
hospitals need to increase their quality in order to maintain their levels of reimbursement 
and make M&A a truly viable option. 
 The results of the analysis regarding the number of staffed beds available in a 
hospital, regardless of treatment, suggest that the attention of hospital price, cost, and 
quality watchdogs should be instead directed towards hospital bed size. While bed size 
does increase for a hospital organization as a result of hospital mergers or acquisitions, 
the results suggest that large hospitals are charging higher prices, have higher costs to 
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payers, and lower quality regardless of consolidation status, implying that M&A with 
significant bed size changes should be scrutinized, but hospitals which are already large 
or debating expansion should be investigated as well.  
!
C. Limitations of the Study 
 The findings of this study are not without limitations. The results presented in the 
OLS regressions may suffer from the problem of endogeneity identified by Dafny (2009) 
due to the fact that hospital merger motivations are not controlled for in the OLS 
regressions because it is difficult to encompass all outstanding motivations. The estimates 
presented in all methods of estimation may be biased because revenue, quality 
performance, staffed bed, and hospital type data came from the most recent data 
available, creating a time mismatch between the consolidated and unconsolidated hospital 
information. This also curtailed the breadth of analysis on revenue and quality 
performance as only one year of data was available for these variables. 
!
D. Suggestions for Future Research !
 The results of this study present an interesting question, future research could 
debate whether or not hospitals need to charge more in order to achieve higher quality 
outcomes. To further the work of this study, an expanded list of diagnoses could be 
included to gather more conclusive results, and matching hospitals within their direct 
Hospital Referral Region (HRR) could provide an interesting examination of the potential 
anti-competitive effects of hospital M&A. Additionally, if a greater range of payment 
data became publicly available, analysis on a lengthier history of hospital consolidation 
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could be completed. A separate study could look at what is occurring in terms of the 
results of lower prices combined with higher revenues to ascertain if hospitals are serving 
more patients or simply charging more for diagnoses not examined in this study.  
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TABLES !
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables 
Variables Unconsolidated 
Hospitals
Consolidated Hospitals
Overall Hospital Metrics
Gross Patient Revenue 
In Thousands of U.S. Dollars
918,509.80 
(56,618.90)
917,009.70 
(20,403.14)*
Total Performance Score 
Reported out of 100
37.36 
(0.19)
35.01 
(0.83)*
Beds 
Number of Staffed Beds
226.96 
(3.60)
227.47 
(10.30)
Number of Observations 3,116 161
Diagnoses
Medicare Payments 291 
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or 
Comorbidities
8,968.13 
(51.26)
8,805.99 
(154.62)
Average Total Payments 291 
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or 
Comorbidities
9,947.20 
(56.69)
9,781.54 
(171.25)
Average Covered Charges 291 
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or 
Comorbidities
35,792.90 
(519.22)
30,301.89 
(1,586.80)*
Number of Observations 1,634 86
Medicare Payments 039 
Extracranial Procedures without Complications or 
Comorbidities
5,596.63 
(35.25)
5,374.80 
(87.85)
Average Total Payments 039 
Extracranial Procedures without Complications or 
Comorbidities
7,228.69 
(47.91)
7,027.89 
(139.93)
Average Covered Charges 039 
Extracranial Procedures without Complications or 
Comorbidities
32,123.72 
(468.83)
26,542.59 
(1,600.37)*
Number of Observations 987 57
Medicare Payments 190 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major 
Complications or Comorbidities
6,726.65 
(28.19)
6,648.34 
(88.05)
Average Total Payments 190 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major 
Complications or Comorbidities
7,967.70 
(33.14)
7,862.92 
(108.46)
Average Covered Charges 190 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major 
Complications or Comorbidities
30,133.44 
(335.47)
27,749.87 
(1,327.42)
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Note: The above values are the observed means. The standard errors are below in parentheses. All 
monetary values are in constant 2015 dollars. Diagnosis definitions were provided by cms.gov. 
*An indication of that the observed mean of the consolidated hospitals is significantly different 
from the observed mean of the unconsolidated hospitals, p<0.05. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Number of Observations 2,891 154
Medicare Payments 193 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major 
Complications or Comorbidities
8,858.60 
(34.64)
8,395.19 
(110.21)
Average Total Payments 193 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major 
Complications or Comorbidities
9,806.925 
(39.39)
9,665.70 
(134.71)
Average Covered Charges 193 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major 
Complications or Comorbidities
37,821.97 
(411.05)
33,672.82 
(1,529.72)*
Number of Observations 2,787 150
Medicare Payments 282 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/
out Complications or Comorbidities
4,150.87 
(38.67)
3,992.73 
(118.25)
Average Total Payments 282 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/
out Complications or Comorbidities
5,392.43 
(46.74)
5,273.36 
(174.97)
Average Covered Charges 282 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/
out Complications or Comorbidities
25,068.05 
(506.18)
2,1132.72 
(1,620.34)
Number of Observations 635 38
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Table 2. Estimates of the effects of mergers and acquisitions using OLS with the log 
of revenue, log of performance, and logs of prices and costs for selected diagnoses as 
dependent variables.  
OLS Regressor Estimates
Dependent Variables (1) 
Treatment
(2) 
Beds
logGrossPatientRevenue 
In U.S. Dollars
0.231 
(0.059)**
0.399 
(0.006)**
R-squared 0.634
logTotalPerformanceScore 
Reported out of 100
-0.090 
(0.023)**
-0.035 
(0.002)**
R-squared 0.140
logMedicarePayments291 
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or Comorbidities
-0.003 
(0.017)
0.036 
(0.002)**
R-squared 0.379
logAverageTotalPayments291 
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or Comorbidities
-0.00090 
(0.017)
0.039 
(0.0019)**
R-squared 0.396
logAverageCoveredCharges291 
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or Comorbidities
-0.048 
(0.0425)
0.076 
(0.0047)**
R-squared 0.499
logMedicarePayments039 
Extracranial Procedures without Complications or Comorbidities
-0.035 
(0.020)
0.027 
(0.0020)**
R-squared 0.410
logAverageTotalPayments039 
Extracranial Procedures w/out Complications or Comorbidities
-0.012 
(0.021)
0.029 
(0.002)**
R-squared 0.402
logAverageCoveredCharges039 
Extracranial Procedures w/out Complications or Comorbidities
-0.128 
(0.0524)***
0.028 
(0.005)**
R-squared 0.363
logMedicarePayments190 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major Complications or 
Comorbidities
-0.0056 
(0.013)***
0.031 
(0.0015)**
R-squared 0.357
logAverageTotalPayments190 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major Complications or 
Comorbidities
-0.010 
(0.012)
0.034 
(0.0014)**
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Note: The above values are the regression coefficients. The standard errors are below in 
parentheses. R-squared values are in italics. The values for beds represent a change of 100 beds. 
All monetary values are in constant 2015 dollars. Diagnoses definitions were provided by 
cms.gov. 
*** = Significant at 1%, ** = Significant at 5%, * = Significant at 10% !!!!!!!!!!
R-squared 0.366
logAverageCoveredCharges190 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ Major Complications or 
Comorbidities
-0.0092 
(0.0305)
0.063 
(0.0035)**
R-squared 0.519
logMedicarePayments193 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major Complications or Comorbidities
-0.0155 
(0.0124)
0.031 
(0.0014)**
R-squared 0.365
logAverageTotalPayments193 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major Complications or Comorbidities
-0.012 
(0.0121)
0.036 
(0.0014)**
R-squared 0.380
logAverageCoveredCharges193 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major Complications or Comorbidities
-0.0519 
(0.032)
0.059 
(0.0035)**
R-squared 0.490
logMedicarePayments282 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/out Complications or 
Comorbidities
-0.00882 
(0.0286)
0.024 
(0.0029)**
R-squared 0.361
logAverageTotalPayments282 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/out Complications or 
Comorbidities
0.002 
(0.027)
0.031 
(0.0027)**
R-squared 0.360
logAverageCoveredCharges282 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive w/out Complications or 
Comorbidities
-0.016 
(0.066)
0.060 
0.0067**
R-squared 0.448
Sample Size 3,277
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Table 3. Estimates of the effects of mergers and acquisitions using matching 
methods with the log of revenue, log of performance, and the logs of prices and costs 
for selected diagnoses as dependent variables. 
Matching Methods Estimates
Dependent Variables (1) 
Nearest Neighbor
(1) 
Kernel
(3) 
Stratificatio
n
logGrossPatientRevenue 
In U.S. Dollars
0.550 
(0.148)**
0.278 
(0.088)***
0.310 
(0.076)***
logTotalPerformanceScore 
Reported out of 100
-0.062 
(0.038)
-0.091 
(0.023)***
-0.106 
(0.024)***
logMedicarePayments291 
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or 
Comorbidities
-0.031 
(0.031)
-0.018 
(0.019)
-0.027 
(0.018)
logAverageTotalPayments291 
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or 
Comorbidities
-0.027 
(0.025)
-0.017 
(0.015)
-0.025 
(0.016)
logAverageCoveredCharges291 
Heart Failure & Shock w/ Complications or 
Comorbidities
-0.314 
(0.101)**
-0.140 
(0.051)***
-0.133 
(0.056)**
logMedicarePayments039 
Extracranial Procedures without 
Complications or Comorbidities
-0.050 
(0.028)*
-0.042 
(0.014)**
N/A
logAverageTotalPayments039 
Extracranial Procedures w/out 
Complications or Comorbidities
-0.084 
(0.040)***
-0.031 
(0.023)
N/A
logAverageCoveredCharges039 
Extracranial Procedures w/out 
Complications or Comorbidities
-0.367 
(0.085)***
-0.233 
(0.060)***
N/A
logMedicarePayments190 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ 
Major Complications or Comorbidities
-0.045 
(0.027)*
-0.012 
(0.012)
-0.018 
(0.014)
logAverageTotalPayments190 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ 
Major Complications or Comorbidities
-0.054 
(0.025)**
-0.017 
(0.014)
-0.020 
(0.013)
logAverageCoveredCharges190 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder w/ 
Major Complications or Comorbidities
-0.270 
(0.080)***
-0.085 
(0.040)**
-0.063 
(0.037)*
logMedicarePayments193 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major 
Complications or Comorbidities
-0.043 
(0.021)**
-0.017 
(0.013)
-0.023 
(0.012)*
logAverageTotalPayments193 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major 
Complications or Comorbidities
-0.049 
(0.030)
-0.014 
(0.012)
-0.019 
(0.015)
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Note: The above values are the regression coefficients. The standard errors are below in 
parentheses. The values for beds represent a change of 100 beds. All monetary values are in 
constant 2015 dollars. N/A values resulted from diagnoses not having sufficient information to 
support the models. Diagnoses definitions were provided by cms.gov. 
*** = Significant at 1%, ** = Significant at 5%, * = Significant at 10% !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
logAverageCoveredCharges193 
Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy w/ Major 
Complications or Comorbidities
-0.278 
(0.072)***
-0.109 
(0.033)***
-0.099 
(0.046)**
logMedicarePayments282 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged 
Alive w/out Complications or Comorbidities
-0.007 
(0.034)
-0.031 
(0.023)
-0.031 
(0.029)
logAverageTotalPayments282 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged 
Alive w/out Complications or Comorbidities
0.004 
(0.042)
-0.022 
(0.025)
-0.020 
(0.031)
logAverageCoveredCharges282 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged 
Alive w/out Complications or Comorbidities
-0.228 
(0.111)**
-0.172 
(0.071)**
-0.125 
(0.079)
Sample Size 3,277 3,277 3,277
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!
APPENDIX !
APPENDIX A1 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND SOURCES !
Note: All monetary values were chained to constant 2015 dollars to remove the effect of 
inflation from the analysis.  
!
 GrossPatientRevenue: Gross Patient Revenue is the “sticker price” for hospital 
services provided to patients during a fiscal year. This is the amount of U.S. dollars a 
hospital would receive for their services rendered if insurers did not negotiate lower rates 
or issue denials, or if hospitals did not provide charity care or fall victim to bad debts. 
Source: American Hospital Directory “Hospital Statistics by State”. 
 TotalPerformanceScore: The total performance score received by a hospital is a 
combined score which comes from four equally weighted component scores. The first 
score is the clinical care domain, which looks at hospital mortality rates. The Patient 
Experience score is the second component and is derived from mandatory follow up 
services administered to Medicare patients after a stay in the hospital. The safety domain 
comes from a range of sources, including a patient safety measure, infection prevention 
measures, and delivery of care measures. The last component included to arrive at the 
total performance score is the efficiency and cost reduction component, which looks at 
Medicare Spending per Beneficiary. Hospitals must have scores in at least 3 of the 4 
components to receive an overall score, and their final total performance score is the 
weighted average of all of their components, with an eligible range of 0 to 100 Source: 
Data.Medicare.gov Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) - Total Performance Score 
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Database (https://data.medicare.gov/Hospital-Compare/Hospital-Value-Based-
Purchasing-HVBP-Total-Perform/ypbt-wvdk). 
 MedicarePayments291: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with 
DRG 291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: 
Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”. 
 AverageTotalPayment291: The average total cost to patients and secondary 
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major 
Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and 
Payment Public Use File”. 
 AverageCoveredCharges291: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals 
for a diagnosis of DRG 291: Heart Failure & Shock with Major Complications or 
Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use 
File”. 
 MedicarePayments039: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with 
DRG 039: Extracranial Procedures without Complications or Major Complications or 
Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use 
File”. 
 AverageTotalPayments039: The average total cost to patients and secondary 
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 039: Extracranial Procedures without 
Complications or Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The 
Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”. 
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 AverageCoveredCharges039: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals 
for a diagnosis of DRG 039: Extracranial Procedures without Complications or Major 
Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and 
Payment Public Use File”. 
 MedicarePayments190: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with 
DRG 190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder with Major Complications or 
Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use 
File”. 
 AverageTotalPayments190: The average total cost to patients and secondary 
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder 
with Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient 
Utilization and Payment Public Use File”. 
 AverageCoveredCharges190: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals 
for a diagnosis of DRG 190: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder with Major 
Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and 
Payment Public Use File”. 
 MedicarePayments193: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with 
DRG 193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with Major Complications or Comorbidities. 
Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”. 
 AverageTotalPayments193: The average total cost to patients and secondary 
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with 
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Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and 
Payment Public Use File”. 
 AverageCoveredCharges193: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals 
for a diagnosis of DRG 193: Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy with Major Complications or 
Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use 
File”. 
 MedicarePayments282: The average cost in USD to Medicare for patients with 
DRG 282: Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive without Complications or 
Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and 
Payment Public Use File”. 
 AverageTotalPayments282: The average total cost to patients and secondary 
insurances in USD for a diagnosis of DRG 282: Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged 
Alive without Complications or Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: 
Medicare, “The Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”. 
 AverageCoveredCharges282: The average total price in USD charged by hospitals 
for a diagnosis of DRG 282: Acute Myocardial Infarction, Discharged Alive without 
Complications or Major Complications or Comorbidities. Source: Medicare, “The 
Inpatient Utilization and Payment Public Use File”. 
 Treatment: Hospitals which underwent a merger or acquisition between 2012 and 
2014 were assigned a value of 1 for this dummy variable specification. These hospitals 
were identified through the use of yearly merger and acquisition reports for the years 
2012, 2013, and 2014. All hospitals included in the analysis which did not undergo a 
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consolidation activity in the above specified years received a dummy variable value of 
“0”. Source: Irving Levin Associates “The Health Services Acquisition Report” Years 
2012, 2013, 2014.  
 Beds: This number is a measure of how many staffed beds all hospitals registered 
with the American Hospital Directory had in the year 2017. Staffed beds is the number of 
beds a hospital has adequate staff to provide care for within state legal guidelines. This 
number may differ from the amount of licensed beds a hospital has, which is the number 
of permitted beds in a hospital facility, regardless of staffing levels. Source: AHD 
“Hospital Statistics by State”. 
 HospitalType: The ownership type of U.S. hospitals. This is defined by what type 
of organization the hospital is reported as for tax purposes, originally divided by 
Government, Voluntary Nonprofit, or Proprietary (For-profit). Government and Voluntary 
Nonprofit are further divided. Government is divided into Federal, State, Local, and 
Hospital District Authority while Voluntary Nonprofit is delineated by Private, Church, 
and Other. Source: Data Lists: “U.S. Hospital Database”.  
 State: The state which each hospital included in the analysis is registered in. Each 
state received a dummy variable value which was equal to 1 when a hospital in that state 
was being assessed, or 0 when the hospital being assessed was from a different state. 
Source: AHD “Hospital Statistics by State”. 
!
!
!
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APPENDIX A2 
DESCRIPTION OF MATCHING METHODS USED FOR ESTIMATION 
  
 The three matching methods presented in this analysis are variations of propensity 
score matching. Propensity score matching is a statistical technique which seeks to 
determine the effect of a treatment or policy, making it suitable for examining the effect 
of the observational consolidation “treatment” in this study (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). After being divided into consolidated and unconsolidated groups, the hospitals in 
this study received their propensity score based upon their number of staffed beds, the 
state in which their primary address is listed, and the year in which they underwent a 
merger or acquisition if one occurred at all. Once both the merged and unmerged hospital 
groups received their propensity score, they were compared via the three matching 
methods as described below. Each matching method uses a specific methodology to 
measure the differences between the consolidated and unconsolidated hospitals in an 
attempt to ascertain what effect hospital mergers and acquisitions have on the financial 
and quality outcomes evaluated in this study. 
!
Nearest Neighbor Matching 
 Nearest neighbor matching is one of the most commonly used methods of 
propensity score matching and compares the treatment entities to the control entities 
which are most like them in terms of propensity score. Nearest neighbor matching first 
divides the treated and control groups and then randomly orders both groups. The first 
treated entity is then matched with the control entity with the propensity score which is 
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the shortest distance from its own score. The matching continues down the list until all of 
the treated entities receive a match. All control entities which do not match with a 
treatment entity are then discarded. Outputs for nearest neighbor matching represent the 
differences between a treated entity and the nearest available control comparator. This 
method effectively minimizes the difference between the estimated propensity scores for 
the two groups, considering the effects of treatment on entities by comparing entities 
which are most like each other based upon the contributing factors to the propensity score 
(Stuart, 2010).  
!
Kernel Matching 
 Kernel Matching evaluates the differences between treatment and control groups 
by first computing the average of the propensity scores of all of the control entities. The 
propensity score of each treated entity is then compared to the computed average of the 
control entities, with the resulting output coefficients being the differences between the 
treated entity and the average of the control entities. Because kernel matching takes the 
average of the controls, this often lowers the variance of the outcomes, but also may not 
always be an example of the best matches because the treated entities may not always be 
similar to the entity represented by the average of the controls (Caliendo and Kopeining, 
2008).  
!
!
!
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Stratification Matching 
 The goal of stratification matching is to eliminate bias which could arise from the 
underlying variables. After separating the propensity scores of the treated and control 
entities into two defined groups the propensity scores are ranked and stratified into five 
equal size groups. The corresponding quintiles are then compared, effectively 
demonstrating the differences between two stratums which theoretically have similar 
propensity scores, assuming the treated and control groups have propensity score ranges 
that are similar. The regression outputs show the average of the differences between the 
treated and control stratums (Austin, 2011). 
!55
